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Abstract 
 
KNOX, RON. Reform in the Credit Rating Industry. Department of Economics, June 
2011. 
 
ADVISOR: Professor Mehmet Fuat Sener 
 
Ninety three percent of all AAA-rated subprime mortgage backed securities 
issued in 2006 were downgraded to junk bond status subsequent to the financial crisis. 
The credit rating agencies clearly failed to give the early warning signs on these and 
numerous financial products that went bust. 
This thesis investigates the role of credit rating agencies in the functioning of 
financial markets and proposes policy changes to reform this industry. The sources of 
market failures in this industry can be traced to conflicts of interest, barriers to entry, lack 
of accountability, and asymmetric information. I propose three possible reforms to 
improve the efficiency and accuracy of financial product ratings: a government-based 
model, a subscription-based model, and a market-based model. I provide a comparative 
evaluation of each model, discuss their implementability and demonstrate how they can 
solve the identified market imperfections.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The credit rating industry has been a central focus of the financial world since the 
2007 financial crisis. During the 2007 financial crisis nearly $3.2 trillion1 in loans were 
provided to homeowners with bad debt and undocumented income. These mortgages 
were then packaged up into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt 
obligations (CDO). These two financial innovations, along with the ratings provided by 
the agencies, played a significant role in the 2007 financial crisis.  A mortgage-backed 
security is a type of asset that is secured by a mortgage or collection of mortgages. These 
securities are also grouped in one of the top two ratings as determined by an accredited 
credit rating agency, and usually pay periodic payments that are similar to coupon 
payments. Furthermore, the mortgage must have originated from a regulated and 
authorized financial institution. Collateralized debt obligations are an investment-grade 
security backed by a pool of bonds, loans and other assets. CDOs do not specialize in one 
type of debt but are often non-mortgage loans or bonds.  
The reason why these two innovations had such a large impact during the last 
recession was because they received very high ratings; mostly AAA, from credit ratings 
agencies and the products were not actually worthy of AAA ratings. Receiving a AAA 
rating means that these products are the safest type of products with the lowest 
probability of default. When a product receives a AAA rating, this means that there will 
typically be a strong demand for the product. This rating is also important because certain 
institutions and investors can only invest in products with AAA ratings, so without these 
ratings the demand would have been significantly less and many institutions could not 
                                                 
1 See Economic Review Journal. Statistics compiled by Bloomberg.  
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have purchased them. These financial products were problematic because of the 
underlying mortgages and loans that were issued were sub-prime, which ended up 
defaulting when the homeowners could not make the mortgage payments. Nearly 80%2 
of all the sub-prime mortgages that were issued were adjustable rate mortgages. Initially, 
the homeowners could afford the monthly payments, however, when the rate of the 
mortgage increased, they could no longer make the monthly payments, thus defaulting 
(see graph below for foreclosure numbers). 
QuickTime™ and a
 decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
 
This meant that these two products lost significant value and at some point, nearly, 
became worthless. Banks and other institutions that invested in these products ended up 
                                                 
2 See “Senator Dodd: Create, Sustain, Preserve, and Protect the American Dream of 
Home Ownership”. Dodd. 2007.  
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having to write off over $525 billion3 in losses as a result of the defaults on the 
mortgages. There was significant moral hazard associated with the financial institutions 
that issued these mortgages and loans to subprime debtors, that should have never 
received the loans. The banks that issued these mortgages did not have to hold the 
mortgages because they would get packaged up and sold to investors. Some speculate 
that the issuers of the mortgages did not actually care if the individuals were worthy to 
receive these loans; they just wanted to write as many loans as they could so they could 
make as much money as possible. When these loans defaulted, the issuers were not 
holding the mortgages so they didn’t have the losses that the investors had. This is just 
one example of how credit rating agencies and highly rated financial products can have a 
large impact on financial markets as well as the overall economy.  
What role did credit rating agencies play in the financial crisis? The credit rating 
agencies were the catalyst for the 2007 financial crisis. Credit rating agencies were 
largely responsible for the unsustainable growth of the asset-backed debt markets4, which 
eventually led to the crisis. These agencies fueled the growth for asset-backed debt 
markets because they were providing ratings on these financial products. As long as these 
products receive an “investment grade” rating, there will be substantial demand and the 
higher the rating of the product, the safer it is considered to be. Many of the structured 
finance products that were being created, such as CDOs, were extremely complex and 
very opaque, thus, the market depended on credit rating agencies. The high ratings lured 
investors in to the market and caused the market to expand significantly. The downgrades 
                                                 
3 For more information on losses that result from sub prime mortgages see Onaran 
(2008). 
4 For more information on the 2007 financial crisis see: Reinhart, Carmen; Rogoff, 
Kenneth. (2007) 
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on financial products caused the market to collapse just as fast. The credit rating agencies 
created a demand for these asset-backed financial products by inaccurately rating them. 
The financial products, evidently, were not worthy of the ratings they received but 
investors, blindly, made investment decisions based off of the ratings these agencies 
provided. 
 
A. Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Financial Markets 
Credit rating agencies play a critical role in the operation of financial markets. 
Credit rating agencies provide information and quality assessments on various financial 
innovations5. The main objective of these agencies, such as Moody’s, is to determine the 
creditworthiness of firms and securities. In order to provide their ratings, they analyze 
various financial, industry, and economic information. The credit ratings agencies receive 
fees from the issuers that were rated. Credit rating agencies are essential in the financial 
markets and numerous institutions and regulators rely on their ratings. Credit rating 
agencies can have a dramatic impact on a firm’s securities because they provide 
information to the buyers and sellers. Ratings can help a securities price as well as 
liquidity.  
There are a couple problems with credit ratings agencies. First, credit ratings only 
contain information about cash flow risk. However, they do not include systemic risk 
factors. This means that the ratings do not take economic statistics and factors into 
consideration. An example of this is how the credit ratings agencies rated mortgage-
backed securities; they did not take into consideration how a housing market collapse 
                                                 
5 For more information on the role of credit rating agencies see: Coval, Joshua, Jurek, 
Jakub, Stafford, Erik. (2008) 
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would affect mortgage-backed securities and investors. A second problem with the credit 
rating agencies is their lack of transparency in the ratings process. Another concern is that 
there may be a conflict of interest between the credit rating agencies and the issuers being 
rated. There may be a conflict of interest because the issuers are paying the credit rating 
agencies for their services. Credit rating agencies play an extremely large role on 
financial markets because institutions, regulators, and personal investors all make 
investment decisions based on their ratings. 
 
B. Credit Rating Agencies During the Financial Crisis 
The three major credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) 
rated numerous products incorrectly during the 2007 financial crisis. The ratings agencies 
were not affected by the inaccurate rating like many large institutions and investors. The 
credit rating agencies did not have to write off billions of dollars in loses, which is 
exactly what the institutions and investors had to do. However, a feedback mechanism 
that could have affected the credit rating could have been their share price. If there was a 
significant decline in the credit rating agencies’ share prices than this would indicate that 
the market is holding them accountable. The only credit rating agency of the three major 
ones that is not a subsidiary is Moody’s. Moody’s is publicly traded and its symbol is 
MCO. Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings are both subsidiaries of larger companies, 
McGraw-Hill Companies and Fimalac, respectively. How was the share price of each of 
the companies affected by the financial crisis?  
Each of these three companies had a significant drop in their share prices during 
and after the recession. Moody’s share price had rapidly increased since 2000 reaching its 
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all time high in October of 2007 of $73.716 per share. Throughout the financial crisis, 
Moody’s share value steadily decline to a low of $16.04 per share. This is a significant 
loss of market capitalization and was seen with the other credit rating agencies parent 
companies as well. McGraw-Hill Companies (symbol MHP) reach an all time high of 
$71 per share in 2007 and dropped to a low of $17.64 per share during early 2009. 
Fimalac (symbol FIM.PA) also reached its high in 2007 at $80.12 per share and 
significantly decreased to $21.80 per share in 2009. These three companies follow a 
similar pattern, losing a considerable amount of market capitalization throughout the 
financial crisis.  
Was the decrease in share value a result of their inaccurate ratings? It is plausible 
that each of these companies lost nearly 80% of their market capitalization as a result of 
their failure to accurately rate numerous financial products. However, during the same 
time period the major stock indices also lost significant value, some as high as 60% of its 
overall value. These three companies had larger losses in value relative to the stock 
indices. It is possible that the market was holding the companies accountable for their 
inaccurate ratings but it is difficult to determine if that was the only factor considering the 
overall stock market had tremendous losses as well. 
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the credit rating agency, identify 
possible imperfections, and propose reforms that could address these issues. Section 2 
discusses the history of the credit rating industry, the identified market imperfections, and 
how the product rating market has addressed some of the same problems that are 
prominently observed in the credit rating industry. Section 3 presents policy 
                                                 
6 All share prices were obtained from Yahoo Finance.  
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recommendations and alternatives to the current system as well as recent legislations that 
have attempted to hold credit rating agencies more accountable. The last section 
summarizes my findings and discusses the shortcomings of the paper. 
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Chapter 2: Analysis of Credit Rating Agencies 
As a result of the financial crisis of 2007, there has been a significant amount of 
focus on the credit rating industry and some of its potential market failures. The three 
main rating agencies are Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch. The credit rating market 
can be best described as an oligopoly. Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s each control 40% 
of the market, Fitch has a market share of 14%, and seven other companies control the 
remaining 6%7. Each of these three companies is a Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization, appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The recent 
recession has brought credit rating agencies to the forefront and suggests that there might 
be some imperfections in the credit rating market. There could be potential imperfections 
in the credit rating industry because of the lack of competition, conflicts of interest, 
quality of ratings, and lack of accountability. Credit rating agencies have been a focal 
point because of the ratings they provided to some of the financial products, which in 
hindsight, were clearly not deserving of those ratings. One specific example is when the 
big three credit rating agencies failed to downgrade Enron’s investment ratings prior to 
the company’s bankruptcy. As a result, individual investors held civil suits against most 
of the major credit rating agencies. The ratings that the three main agencies provide to 
financial products are listed below:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See White (2001) for more information.  
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Table 1: Types of Ratings 
  Rating Agency 
Rating Group Moody's S&P, Fitch 
      
Investment Grade 
AAA AAA 
AA AA 
A A 
Baa BBB 
      
Speculative Grade 
Ba BB 
B B 
Caa CCC 
Ca CC 
C C 
      
Default D D 
 
The Table 1 above illustrates how the credit rating agencies determine the credit 
worthiness of financial product. The highest rating with the least amount of risk is a AAA 
rating, while the lowest rating with the highest amount of risk is a C rating.  Investment 
grade products are rated BBB or Baa and above. Ratings are essential in the credit rating 
industry because they could drive demand to a specific product or cause a dramatic sell 
off, if downgraded.  
 
A. Industrial Background 
John Moody was the first one publishing bond ratings. Moody’s firm first started 
publishing bond ratings in 19098. This financial innovation sparked other companies to 
enter the market. Poor’s Publishing Company entered in 1916, Standard Statistics 
                                                 
8 See “The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis” by White (2001) 
for more information. 
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Company in 1922, and Fitch Publishing Company in 1924. Initially these rating 
companies sold their ratings to investors and investors paid for their product.  
 During the 1920s and 1930s thousands of banks failed as a result of the Great 
Depression. Throughout the decade of the 1920’s an average of 70 banks failed nationally 
each year9. The number of bank failures significantly increased in the 1930s. In the year 
of 1933, it is estimated that over 4,000 banks defaulted and around 9,000 banks defaulted 
for the entire decade of the 1930s. As a result of these bank failures, a few key changes 
that took place. The first change is the creation of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1934. The SEC prompted legislative changes, which incorporated credit 
ratings, making these agencies even more important. The SEC and new legislation 
encouraged banks to hold safe bonds in their portfolios to reduce risk. In 1936, federal 
regulations prohibited banks from investing in any product that was “speculative.” This 
meant that they could only hold financial products that were “investment grade”, 
meaning that they were BBB or better. These guidelines still apply to banks today. This 
financial regulation made credit rating agencies key players in the financial markets and, 
also, provided them with a significant amount of power. Banks could no longer make 
their own judgments about the risk of a certain financial products, they were required to 
go on the ratings of the main credit rating agencies. Insurance companies also started to 
use credit ratings when state regulators wanted the companies to have adequate capital to 
support the riskiness of the bonds they held. The state imposed capital requirements as a 
result and credit rating agencies were once again called upon. In 1941, Standard and 
Poor’s merged to form the big three credit rating agencies that are present today. During 
                                                 
9 See Ganzel (2003) 
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the 1970s, federal regulators required pension funds, state and federal, to get their ratings 
from these agencies. In 1975, the SEC created the Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organization (NRSRO) to ensure that there weren’t illegitimate firms creating 
AAA ratings. The SEC “grandfathered” the big three firms in; Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s, and Fitch. The SEC and federal regulators adopted the NRSROs as a source of 
ratings that their financial institutions must heed in their choices in financial products.  
 By the end of 2000, there were only three NRSROs. The SEC was the regulator 
that limited entry into the market. Some believe, the SEC was not transparent in its 
selections for NRSROs either. Up until 2000 or so, they never had defined criteria and 
never explained its decisions when rejecting applications. In 2003, the SEC was feeling 
pressure to expand the number of NRSROs so it admitted Dominion Bond Rating 
Services. In 2005, the SEC admitted A.M. Best into the NRSRO. In 2006, Congress 
passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, which instructed the SEC to allow other 
agencies to enter the market and also made them develop a strict set of guidelines. In 
2007, there were three new agencies admitted; Japan Credit Rating Agency, Rating and 
Information, Inc., and Egan-Jones. In 2008, two more were admitted; Lace Financial and 
Realpoint. Although more agencies have entered the credit rating market, they have not 
been competing with the big three and imperfections in the market still exist. These 
companies have not been directly competing with the big three because some of the 
companies rate different products, like insurance, and because of the reputation of the 
main three agencies.  
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B. Imperfections in the Credit Rating Industry 
 i. Lack of Competition 
What are the underlying imperfections in the credit rating market? The first major 
flaw with the credit rating market is the lack of competition. Competition encourages 
firms to be more accurate with their ratings or else institutions and investors will no 
longer consider utilizing those ratings. Competition drives often leads to low quality 
companies exiting the market. There are two main reasons why there is a lack of 
competition in the credit rating industry, regulation and reputation. In 197510, the SEC 
designated bond-rating agencies as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations” 
(NRSROs). The SEC automatically designated the current big three agencies (Moody’s, 
Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) as NRSROs. This automatic designation “grandfathered” 
them into their current positions and the oligopoly market. This designation meant that 
companies had to go through these agencies in order to have their products rated, so the 
SEC effectively established an oligopoly market for credit rating agencies. The structure 
of this market has remained the same for the past 30 years until recent regulations. 
Current regulations also slightly limit who enters the market, the ultimate decision is left 
up to the SEC. The second reason that there is a lack of competition is because of 
reputational capital11. Reputational capital plays a significant role because investors and 
institutions rely on established agencies with a reputation of accurate ratings. Moody’s 
CEO, Raymond McDaniel, once said “ we are in a business where reputational capital is 
                                                 
10 For further information see “Testimony: The Role and Impact of Credit Rating 
Agencies on the Subprime Credit Markets” by Christopher Cox (Chairman of the SEC) 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2007/ts092607cc.htm 
11 Partnoy (1999) discusses reputational capital and how important it is to credit rating 
agencies.  
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more important.” Reputational capital makes entry into the market difficult because 
institutions will continue to use an agency with a track record as opposed to a brand new 
agency with no reputation. 
Institutions and investors also prefer a few agencies rather than a larger number of 
agencies. The reason for this is because that when reading the ratings on certain financial 
products they prefer not to have numerous different ratings by different companies. 
Investors prefer a select group of ratings because it keeps transaction costs low. A large 
number of credit rating agencies, essentially, requires the investor to do more research to 
determine the actual rating of the financial product as oppose to a select group of 
agencies doing it for them.  
Although lack of competition is extremely important, there is a direct correlation 
with the amount of competition in the credit rating market and quality of ratings 
determined by the agencies. The way Becker and Milbourn (2009) determined the level 
of competition was by Fitch’s market share. Meaning, when Fitch’s market share 
increased there was more competition in the credit rating industry. The ratings were 
gathered from all agencies, not just Fitch. The graph below clearly demonstrates that 
competition promotes higher rates, and an overall lower quality of rating12. The blue bars 
signify low competition in the credit rating market, meaning that Fitch had a relatively 
small market share. The yellow bars signify periods, which Fitch had a larger market 
share and competition was greater in the credit rating market. The graph below covers all 
bond ratings from investment grade to speculative bonds. Starting with BBB- bonds and 
                                                 
12 See Becker and Milbourn (2009). Becker and Milbourn believe that even if there is 
more competition in the credit rating industry, that it would not make a difference 
because of the reputations of the existing firms in the market. The increased competition 
will only strengthen the importance of reputation.  
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moving right, it is evident that during periods of higher competition, bonds receive higher 
ratings than in periods of low competition. Looking to the left of BBB- bonds another 
trend emerges, during periods of low competition more financial products are rated lower 
than in periods of high competition. The distribution of the ratings shifts to the right, 
meaning higher rated products, during periods of high competition. This graph suggests 
that competition has an impact on the ratings that the agencies provide. A lack of 
competition in the market produces, overall, lower ratings, which mean that the ratings 
are more accurate. The reason why competition is correlated to higher ratings is because 
the agencies are competing for business; therefore they will issue higher ratings to be 
more attractive to the companies that want to have their financial products rated. There is 
a tradeoff between competition and the quality of ratings. Issuers of these financial 
products benefit when there is more competition in the market. The argument is that more 
firms in the market will provide better quality ratings but this is the exact opposite 
because more firms are competing for business and thus inflate their ratings to attract 
companies. However, this problem could be alleviated if the credit rating agencies were 
held accountable for their ratings. Credit rating agencies might be held accountable if 
regulation held them liable for the ratings they provided, meaning institutions and 
investors could sue them. Another way in which credit rating agencies could be held 
accountable is by facing fines and large penalties for inaccurate ratings. These are a few 
examples of what could be done.  
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 Source: Becker and Milbourn (2009) 
 
ii. Conflicts of Interest 
The second significant flaw with credit rating agencies is that there are severe 
conflicts of interest. There are two main models that the agencies use; the issuer-pay 
model and the subscription model. There are conflicts of interest associated with each 
model. The issuer-pay model is how credit rating agencies generate the majority of their 
revenue. This is when the institutions pay the agencies in order to have their financial 
products rated. A conflict of interest arises from this because the agencies could provide 
inflated credit ratings in order to attract customers and increase their revenue. Inflated 
credit ratings are concerning because investment decisions are made based on credit 
ratings, an inflated credit rating could draw more investors to a low quality financial 
product. A conflict of interest also arises from the subscription model; this is the model 
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that product-rating agencies use. The subscription model13 is when institutions and 
investors pay the agencies a fee in order to receive their ratings. There are conflicts of 
interest with this model because large subscribers are typically institutions and hedge 
funds. These subscribers typically have long and short positions on various rated 
products. A long positions means that they anticipate the price of the product they own to 
increase. A short position is when the investors anticipate that the value of a product is 
going to decrease, a short position essentially bets against a product. If the credit rating 
agencies were to downgrade a product that the institutions have a long position in, then it 
could lead to potential losses. Therefore, the rating agencies are incentivized to provide 
ratings that benefit their clients or else they might lose their subscribers. Both models that 
credit rating agencies use have inherent conflicts of interest, making it difficult for the 
agencies to provide objective ratings.  
iii. Credit Rating Agencies Have Become Market Creators 
With their ratings, credit rating agencies can channel demand to certain products. 
They have the ability to influence investors to purchase certain products depending on the 
rating it receives. It also works in the opposite direction; credit rating agencies could 
downgrade a product, leading to a significant sell off. The market acts directly upon the 
credit ratings of financial products. The three main agencies all explain in their business 
models that their ratings are opinions of the creditworthiness of the issuers. For example 
Standard & Poor’s clearly states, “Credit ratings are opinions about credit risk published 
by a rating agency. They express opinions about the ability and willingness of an issuer, 
                                                 
13 The subscription-based model eventually became obsolete in the credit rating industry 
because of evolving technology and the free-rider problem. See “The Credit Rating 
Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis” by White (2001). 
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such as a corporation, state or city government, to meet its financial obligations in 
accordance with the terms of those obligations. Credit ratings are also opinions about the 
credit quality of an issue, such as a bond or other debt obligation, and the relative 
likelihood that it may default. Ratings should not be viewed as assurances of credit 
quality or exact measures of the likelihood of default. Rather, ratings denote a relative 
level of credit risk that reflects a rating agency’s carefully considered and analytically 
informed opinion as to the creditworthiness of an issuer or the credit quality of a 
particular debt issue.”  
Fitch has a similar statement for their business model; “Fitch is in the business of 
publishing research and independent ratings and credit analysis of securities issued 
around the world. A rating is our published opinion as to the creditworthiness of a 
security distilled in a simple, easy to use grading system.” Lastly, Moody’s clearly states 
“credit ratings are, and must be construed solely as, statements of opinion and not 
statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, sell or hold any securities. Each 
rating or other opinion must be weighed solely as one factor in any investment decision 
made by or on behalf of any user of the information, and each such user must accordingly 
make its own study and evaluation of each security and of each issuer and guarantor of, 
and each provider of credit support for, each security that it may consider purchasing, 
selling or holding.” These excerpts from the big three credit rating agencies’ mission 
statements clearly demonstrate how they identify their ratings as a matter of opinion. 
Each of their business models also discusses how investment decisions should not be 
based on their ratings. However, we know that certain institutions, like state pension 
funds, require investment in the safest products. It is clear that the ratings provided by 
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these agencies are directly acted upon and have an impact on the financial markets. 
Conflicts of interest are once again an issue because these agencies can essentially 
control what products investors will purchase.  
iv. Asymmetric Information 
The fourth imperfection, which is strongly tied to credit rating agencies being 
market creators, is asymmetric information. There is a significant amount of asymmetric 
information regarding credit rating agencies and the products they rate. The investors do 
not have the same information as the sellers of these products, that is why credit rating 
agencies get involved. However, the credit rating agencies still know more information 
about the creditworthiness of a product than the investors in the product. Typically, the 
issuers of the product know more about the creditworthiness of the product than the 
ratings agencies. An example of this was during the past financial crisis. The issuers of 
CDOs and MBS were putting together products that they knew would be highly rated but 
the underlying assets were not worthy of these ratings. The majority of these products 
defaulted or lost significant value, but the issuers of these products were unaffected 
because they were the ones creating them. In order to make money they need to create a 
demand for the products and the only way to do that is to have them highly rated. Thus, 
there is a significant amount of asymmetric information on the issuers’ behalf. There is 
also asymmetric information with credit rating agencies because investors trust their 
opinions, when the credit rating agencies have more information than the investors. The 
lack of transparency and significant amount of asymmetric information are a few of 
issues in the credit rating market. A result of asymmetric information is adverse selection. 
Adverse selection is a product of asymmetric information. Adverse selection means that 
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there are bound to be “bad” products in the market because sellers know more 
information about the products than the buyers. This is true in the financial markets, 
specifically the credit rating industry. The issuers of financial products know more about 
their inherent risk than any other party. Therefore, “bad” financial products will be issued 
and it is the credit rating agencies’ job to determine the quality of the product. If they 
cannot properly asses the financial product’s inherent risk, a low quality product could be 
issued and receive a high rating. Adverse selection tends to occur when there is 
asymmetric information.  
v. Accountability in the Credit Rating Industry 
Why are credit rating agencies not accountable for their ratings? For the longest 
time credit rating the SEC protected agencies. The SEC adopted a rule that exempted all 
credit rating agencies from any liabilities14. The credit rating agencies that are exempt 
from any liabilities could deceive investors if they wanted and the investors can’t sue for 
the faulty information. This rule was passed nearly 30 years ago and stood throughout the 
2007 financial crisis. These agencies have a significant effect on the financial markets 
and for them to be giving out any rating with any repercussions is a serious problem. An 
example of the effect these agencies can have is the AAA received by mortgage-backed 
securities. Since the agencies put AAA ratings on mortgage backed securities and similar 
products, investors believed they were risk-free assets and, thus, purchased them. Then, 
once people started to realize that the ratings might be inaccurate, the agencies 
downgraded the assets causing a downward spiral that lead to billions of dollars lost. 
While institutions and investors wrote off $525 billion in loses, the agencies were not 
                                                 
14 See Nasiripour (2010) 
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held accountable for their ratings. This demonstrates how credit rating agencies can 
control investment and the sell off of financial products with their ratings and they are, 
clearly, not held accountable for their “opinions”.  
The five largest financial institutions that were involved with MBSs and CDOs 
were Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, and Merrill 
Lynch. In 2004, the SEC passed legislation that enabled these institutions to issue 
substantially more debt. These institutions then used the capital they received from 
issuing the debt to invest in MBSs and CDOs. These five institutions alone reported over 
$4.1 trillion in debt for the 2007 fiscal year. Not only were these institutions issuing more 
debt but they also were using more leverage, increasing their exposure to MBS and 
CDOs. The graph below demonstrates the substantial increases in leverage by these 
institutions from 2003 to 2007. As a result of the excessive exposure and risk these 
companies took to MBSs and CDOs, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns declared 
bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch was bought by Bank of America, and Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley each received a significant amount of capital from the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP). The losses of these institutions can be attributed to the financial 
products they were exposed to, the ratings the products received from the agencies, and 
the regulation that enabled excessive risk.  
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 Although credit rating agencies are exempt from all liabilities under the Securities 
Act of 1933, civil suits have been filed and taken to court. Credit rating agencies have 
been sued in two forms; by institutions and by investors. However, neither or the groups 
have been successful. For example, there was a lawsuit filed against Moody’s by the 
Jefferson County School District in 1999. In this case, the school district claimed that the 
poor rating provided by Moody’s was materially false. The school district also claimed 
defamation and interference with contractual and business relations. This lawsuit was 
dismissed from the county court, thus Moody’s was not held accountable. Another 
example of an institutional lawsuit is Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s (2007). In this case, 
Compuware was suing Moody’s because of alleged breach of contract, defamation, fraud, 
and violations of the Investment Adviser’s Act for issuing a negative report on the 
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company’s financial future. This case was dismissed from court and Moody’s was once 
again not held accountable. A third example of an institution filing a lawsuit against a 
credit rating agency was in 1999, County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos. Orange County 
filed a $2 billion suit against Standard & Poor’s, which is a subsidiary of McGraw Hill 
Cos., because of alleged breach of contract and professional negligence. Both parties 
settled this lawsuit for $140,000, nothing close to the $2 billion in damages the county 
claimed. Institutions filed these three lawsuits against credit rating agencies and each 
lawsuit had a similar result.  
Investors have filed civil suits against credit rating agencies as well. In 2005, 
Enron investors filed a lawsuit against various credit rating agencies. The investors 
claimed negligent misrepresentation and unfair trade practices in the U.S. Distrcit Court 
for the Southern District of Texas for failing to downgrade Enron’s investment ratings 
before it declared bankruptcy. This civil suit was dismissed from court and the court 
found that the First Amendment protected the credit ratings agencies. Another example of 
an investor suing a credit rating agency is Quinn v. McGraw Hill Cos. Quinn was a 
majority shareholder of several Illinois banks who sued Standard & Poor’s as a result of 
Standard & Poor’s rating on collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). The banks that 
Quinn was a majority shareholder in, invested in CMOs after the banks were assured that 
Standard & Poor’s would give the bonds an “A” rating. The CMOs were initially given 
an “A” rating but were later downgraded to “CCC”, which is no longer investment grade. 
As a result of the downgrade the banks and Quinn lost significant amounts of money. The 
courts dismissed the case on the basis that Standard & Poor’s disclaimer says that S&P’s 
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ratings are not a recommendation to buy, sell, or hold financial products. The lawsuits 
filed by the investors have also ended in similarly to the ones filed by institutions. 
The civil suits filed by both institutions and investors demonstrate how credit 
rating agencies are not held accountable for their ratings. Each of the lawsuits filed 
resulted in dismissal from court, with the exception of one that was settle for a small 
fraction of the alleged damages. A lack of accountability is evident in the credit rating 
industry. The companies produce ratings, which are acted upon by institutions and 
investors, and when the ratings are incorrect, the First Amendment protects the agencies 
ensuring that the civil suit will most likely be dismissed.  
Recently, legislation was passed to hold credit rating agencies more accountable 
for the information they provide. This piece of legislation was the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010). This act was intended to hold 
NRSROs more accountable for their ratings. It holds the rating agencies accountable by 
letting investors take action, by the means of a lawsuit, against them if they inaccurately 
rate products. Although this is a step in the right direction there will need to be more 
accountability in order to produce the most accurate ratings.  
vi. Inaccurate Credit Ratings 
The final failure in the credit rating market is the inflation of credit ratings. Credit 
rating agencies have, some suspect knowingly, overrated financial products for various 
reasons. This can have a dramatic impact on the financial markets and the investments of 
institutions. The graph below demonstrates the amount of corporate default from 1920-
2008. The amount of corporate default in 2008 is a sign of a major problem. Around $275 
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billion15 in corporate bonds defaulted during 2008, many of which were not junk bonds 
and had low probabilities of default, according to the credit rating agencies. These losses 
were extremely significant and the inflated ratings were most likely contributed by a 
conflict of interests as oppose to accidentally mis-rating the products. The nominal value 
of corporate default was the highest it has ever been.  
 
There are a few significant imperfections in the credit rating market that need to 
be addressed. Recent legislation has taken a step toward holding rating agencies more 
accountable, however much more needs to be done in order to ensure top quality, 
objective ratings. Credit rating agencies have such a significant impact on the financial 
markets, thus the reason why some policy changes might be needed. A market that has 
been successful in producing accurate and nonbiased ratings is the product rating market. 
The credit rating market might be able to incorporate some aspects of the product rating 
market to ensure they produce the best credit ratings.  
                                                 
15 Fidelity Personal Investing-Credit Default Risk  
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The credit rating industry and the product rating market have many similarities. 
Both industries are tasked with providing accurate ratings on various products in an 
unbiased manor. Companies in the product rating industry have addressed some of the 
credit rating market imperfections. The credit rating industry might be able to incorporate 
some of the policies that the product rating market has in place.  
 
C. Lessons from the Product Rating Market 
 The product rating market has been a relatively efficient rating market. There are 
many aspects of the product rating market that make their ratings some of the most 
reliable. One company with a great reputation is Consumer Reports. Consumer reports 
rates a wide variety of products ranging from cars to televisions. They have taken many 
steps to ensure that their ratings are unbiased and as accurate as possible. Consumer 
Reports publishes its reviews and comparisons of consumer products and services based 
on its own in-house testing. Consumer Reports allocates around $21 million per year for 
its testing process. Their in-house testing is important because there is no other party 
influencing the outcomes of their tests. Consumer Reports attempts to maintain objective 
and provide a unbiased rating because they purchase all their products at full retail price. 
This also eliminates conflicts of interest because they are paying what the consumer 
would pay and are not receiving any free products. Consumer Reports uses the 
subscription model to generate its revenue and currently has around 7.3 million 
subscribers. The subscription model eliminates any conflicts of interest because 
companies are not paying Consumer Reports to have their products rated, the way it 
works in the credit rating industry, therefore Consumer Reports does not have any 
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interest in inflating certain products ratings for certain companies to generate business. 
Consumer Reports, also, does not print outside advertising and it doesn’t allow the 
commercial use of its reports for selling products. This product rating company is strictly 
focused on providing unbiased results to the consumers. They have taken substantial 
measures to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest.  
A significant benefit of the Consumer Reports subscription model is that it 
provides feedback mechanisms. A feedback mechanism is a way the market reacts to the 
ratings Consumer Reports provides. For example, if Consumer Reports frequently 
inflates product rating and gives low quality products high ratings then consumers will 
most likely stop subscribing for Consumer Reports services. Consumer Reports will then 
lose revenue as a result of their poor ratings. A feedback mechanism should be the same 
for the credit rating industry as well. However, two of the big three credit rating agencies 
are not publicly traded because they are subsidiaries of other, larger companies, 
eliminating the share price feedback mechanism. The only company, which is not a 
subsidiary, which is publicly traded is Moody’s. A feedback mechanism might be 
investors selling Moody’s shares as a result of poor ratings on financial products, but 
there is no evidence that this occurs. Feedback mechanisms are crucial in the financial 
markets and are lacking in the credit rating industry. 
 The main drawback from a subscription-based system, like Consumer Reports, is 
that they do not rate all products in the market. This implies that there might be a bias 
because the product rating companies might rate the popular products and overlook a 
quality product that has not been discovered by the market yet. A product rating company 
cannot rate every product in the market, making this a significant drawback.  
 29
 Another company in the product rating market is J.D. Power and Associates. J.D. 
Power and Associates rates a wide variety of products including automobiles, boats, 
electronics and insurance. They conduct their market research through consumer surveys, 
which is completely funded by the company and sample sizes can range from a few 
hundred to over 100,000. Although they fund their own surveys, they choose whether 
their samples are randomly selected or consumer targeted. J.D. Power conducts its own 
vehicle testing in addition to the consumer surveys. The majority of the company’s 
revenue comes from other companies that utilize the market data that J.D. Power 
provides. A small portion of their revenue comes from companies that purchase licenses 
to use and quote J.D. Power and Associates results. There are potential conflicts of 
interest because of the way they generate revenue. Companies that are purchasing J.D. 
Power’s market data might influence J.D. Power to provide better ratings if J.D. Power 
rates the company’s products. It is clear that J.D. Power has not taken the same steps as 
Consumer Reports to address certain conflicts of interest. J.D. Power and Associates is 
similar to credit rating agencies in certain aspects because the way they generate their 
revenue, through an issuer-pay type of model, and the inherent conflicts of interest. 
Although there might be some conflicts of interests, their ratings are highly regarded and 
reliable.  
 How do the mission statements of product rating companies compare to credit 
rating agencies? There are both similarities and differences between the two industries. 
Consumer Reports’ mission statement says “Consumers Union (CU) is an expert, 
independent, nonprofit organization whose mission is to work for a fair, just, and safe 
marketplace for all consumers and to empower consumers to protect themselves. The 
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organization was founded in 1936 when advertising first flooded the mass media. 
Consumers lacked a reliable source of information they could depend on to help them 
distinguish hype from fact and good products from bad ones. Since then CU has filled 
that vacuum with a broad range of consumer information. To maintain its independence 
and impartiality, CU accepts no outside advertising and no free samples and employs 
several hundred mystery shoppers and technical experts to buy and test the products it 
evaluates16.” Consumer Reports’ mission statement does not mention anything about 
opinions or whether or not their ratings should be acted upon. The main objective of their 
mission statement is to emphasize that they have taken steps to address conflicts of 
interest. J.D. Power and Associates’ mission statement says “J.D. Power and Associates 
is a global marketing information services company operating in key business sectors 
across a variety of industries, including market research, automotive forecasting, 
performance improvement, Web intelligence, and customer satisfaction. Established in 
1968, the company has been listening to consumers and business customers; analyzing 
their opinions and perceptions; and refining research techniques and study methodologies 
to offer some of the most advanced product quality, customer satisfaction, and tracking 
research available today. The company’s quality and satisfaction measurements are based 
on responses from millions of consumers annually.” Their mission statement does not 
mention that their ratings are opinions nor does it mention that their ratings should not be 
acted upon. While most credit rating agencies mention that their ratings are published 
opinions and should not be acted on, the product rating market does not take these 
measures.  
                                                 
16 For more information on Consumer Reports see consumerreports.org.  
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 It is evident that the product rating market has managed to get the rating process 
right. There are many aspects of the product rating market that the credit rating industry 
could incorporate to produce the best quality ratings possible.  
 
D. Summary 
 The credit rating industry is very important and has a significant impact on the 
financial system. They have such a large impact because they are market makers. Since 
this industry has so much power in the financial markets, it’s essential that their ratings 
are as accurate as possible. The flaws in the credit rating industry have been exposed with 
the most recent financial crisis. The credit rating industry could potentially learn from the 
product rating market. Companies, like Consumer Reports, have managed to produce 
nonbiased ratings by taking extensive measures to address conflicts of interest, and the 
same could be done in the credit rating market.  
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Chapter 3: A New Framework for the Industry 
 What type of reform would potentially increase the reliability of credit rating 
agencies? It is evident from the previous section that there are some significant 
imperfections in the credit rating market. A large numbers of credit ratings did not 
accurately reflect the ex-post risks embedded and the 2007 financial crisis highlighted 
this. The ratings on various financial products could have been affected by conflicts of 
interest and lack of accountability. There are three types of reform that might provide 
better results than the current ratings system. The credit rating market could be market-
based, subscription based, or government based. There are benefits and drawbacks from 
each option however, they might be more effective at providing the most accurate credit 
ratings.  
 
A. Market-Based System 
 One possible solution that would reform the credit rating industry would be to 
move credit rating agencies to a market-based system, meaning that there are no ratings 
because the market determines the creditworthiness of the product and this is reflected in 
the price of the product. A market-based system would be based on credit default swap 
rates. A credit default swap is a contract in which the buyer of the credit default swap 
makes a series of payments to the seller and receives payoff, in exchange, if the credit 
instrument experiences a credit event, such as default. Credit default swaps are used to 
hedge risk and are a form of reverse trading. For example a product with a low 
probability of defaulting would be traded at lower levels than products with higher 
probabilities of defaulting. The market would, essentially, determine if the specific 
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products are investment grade or speculative based on the prices of the credit default 
swaps.   
 There are many benefits to a market-based system. The first benefit would be the 
elimination of conflicts of interest. Currently, there is a tremendous amount of conflict of 
interest in the credit rating industry and a market-based system would take a significant 
step to ensure that no firms are influencing the ratings of specific financial products. A 
second benefit of moving to a system based on credit default swaps is that investment 
decisions would no longer be based on “upgrades” or “downgrades” put out by credit 
rating agencies. Institutions would be forced to conduct their own research on the 
financial products they are investing in and they are held accountable for the outcomes of 
their investment decisions. A third important benefit is that credit rating agencies would 
no longer be in federal regulations. This means that there will not be an artificial demand 
for certain products just because they are required by regulation.  
It should be noted that a market-based system has some drawbacks. The first 
drawback from a market-based system is that certain financial products will not be 
“rated”. In a market-based system there are not credit default swaps on every product, 
therefore certain products will be omitted from the system, similar to the product rating 
market. In the issuer-pay model, like the current credit rating system, any product can 
receive a rating as long as the issuer pays one of the credit rating agencies. This means 
that specific products are not omitted from the system. A second drawback from a 
market-based system is that specific credit default swaps might not be very liquid. This 
would mean that there is low volume, which would significantly affect the spread (the 
difference between the bid and the ask) of the products being traded. A credit default 
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swap that isn’t very liquid would not reflect the true creditworthiness of the underlying 
financial product. Each system has its advantages and disadvantages, thus making it 
challenging to determine which is the most efficient.  
 Although the market-based system has its drawbacks, it is likely to provide an 
unbiased evaluation of financial products. It will otherwise be difficult to get an unbiased 
evaluation if credit rating agencies are involved. This is just one plausible option that 
would address some of the identified imperfections in the credit rating industry.  
 
B. Subscription-Based System 
 Another possible solution to reform the credit rating industry would be for the 
agencies to move away from the issuer-pay model to the subscription-based model in 
order to generate revenue. The subscription-based model is when investors or institutions 
pay the credit rating agencies in order to get their ratings on specific financial products. 
This is how Consumer Reports operates and how the credit rating agencies operated over 
40 years ago.  
 The subscription model in the credit rating industry has its benefits. One of the 
biggest advantages of this model is that the majority of the existing conflicts of interest 
will be eliminated. Conflicts of interest would be eliminated because companies would 
no longer be paying the agencies to rate their products. The subscription model would 
remove the issuers of the financial products entirely, whereas they currently deal directly 
with the credit rating agencies. A second indirect benefit of this model is that it will 
promote accountability because the subscribers will no longer purchase the credit rating 
agencies’ products if their ratings are constantly inaccurate or inflated. The current 
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issuer-pay model does not hold credit rating agencies accountable for their ratings 
because there is no way for the companies to lose revenue. The current system 
encourages companies to inflate ratings in order to gain issuers. If the agencies provide 
inaccurate ratings there is no way for the investors to hold them accountable, however if 
there was a subscription based model investors could. The subscription model had proven 
to be effective in the product rating market and it could do the same in the credit rating 
industry.  
 However, there are some drawbacks to the subscription model. Similar to the 
market-based system, certain products might be omitted from the rating process. A 
second disadvantage that could arise from the subscription-based model would be the 
free-rider issue. This is the initial reason why the credit rating agencies moved to the 
issuer-pay model. Individuals that do not subscribe to the agencies might get the 
information from a subscriber, causing losses in revenue for the credit rating agencies. 
The free-rider problem is a significant issue with this business model and a cause for 
concern among credit rating agencies. The third disadvantage of this business model is 
that there could be a potential conflict of interests. A conflict of interest could occur 
because of the institutions that would subscribe to receive the rating information. Large 
institutions and hedge funds would be the majority of subscribers and the main form of 
revenue. Institutions and hedge funds invest in various financial products and the ratings 
of these products could have a direct impact on the value of these financial products. The 
credit rating agencies might be incentized to provide inaccurate ratings to keep their 
subscribers happy. If large accounts threaten to cancel their subscription if ratings are not 
to their liking, the agencies could potentially have a conflict of interest. However, a 
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conflict of interest might always exist but taking steps to address it is how the credit 
rating industry will be improved. 
 A fourth drawback of the subscription-based model is that not all of the 
information is accessible to the public. Individual investors would find it difficult to 
obtain credit rating information because the majority of small investors could not afford 
the subscription. However, a plausible solution to price discrimination could be a 
government subsidy. The government could provide an allowance to small investors that 
cannot afford the costly subscription. In the corporate environment the government could 
enable corporations to pay for their subscriptions with pre-tax dollars, which is another 
way of subsidizing the subscription for institutions that cannot afford it. A government 
subsidy would benefit all parties because all investors could obtains a subscription, the 
agencies are generating revenue from new subscribers, and conflicts of interest are 
minimized.  
 The subscription model would be a good alternative to the issuer-pay model. A 
subscription-based system would provide increased accountability while eliminating 
some conflicts of interest. There are drawbacks associated with the subscription-based 
model, like the free-rider problem and omission of certain financial products. Overall, 
this system is a plausible alternative to the issuer-pay model.  
 
C. Government-Based System 
 Implementing a government-based or government funded credit rating agency is 
another possible reform that could make the credit rating industry more efficient. A 
 37
government-based system would be similar to the Food and Drug Administration17. 
Funds in the federal budget would be allocated to ensure the government-based credit 
rating system would be able to operate effectively. The government-based system would 
allow every investor and institution to access its ratings on various financial products. 
The ratings would be public goods and the government would incur all costs. In order to 
have products rated, the issuers would approach the government-based credit rating 
agency and provide all necessary information, as they would to the current private credit 
rating agencies. The issuers of the debt will have to incur all costs associated with the 
ratings process. The government-based system would then provide ratings on the various 
financial products. A government-based system has been sufficient in the food and drug 
market, suggesting that it might be effective in the credit rating industry.  
 There are many benefits to a government-based credit rating agency. The first is 
that credit ratings will be available to everyone because it is a public good. Making credit 
ratings a public good would eliminate some of the disadvantages of the subscription-
based system and the issuer-pay system. A second benefit is that financial products would 
not be omitted from the evaluation process. In a government-based system, all issuers 
would be able to have their products rated, something that would be difficult in a 
subscription-based and market-based system. A third benefit from a government-based 
system would be a central rating agency, as opposed to numerous agencies with different 
types of ratings and rating methodologies. Both institutions and issuers would benefit 
from a uniform way of rating products. A government-based system might encourage 
more accurate ratings because it would have a vested interest in the health of the U.S. 
                                                 
17 For more information on the FDA see fda.gov 
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economy, making it less likely to inflate ratings because of the impact downgrades can 
have.  
 While there are many benefits to a credit rating system backed by the U.S. 
government, there are also disadvantages. If a government-based system were to rate 
financial products there could be a potential conflict of interest. If a government-based 
system were to rate U.S. debt then it might be inclined to provide a AAA rating. The 
government-based agency, most likely, would not downgrade U.S. debt because of the 
negative repercussions it would have in terms of financing and stability. This 
demonstrates how a conflict of interest could arise; however the government-based 
system would be very reliable with corporate debt and financial products. A second 
disadvantage of this system is that the U.S. government backs the credit ratings; therefore 
if financial products are misrated then the government is held accountable. This could 
pose a problem because if the government-based credit rating agency provides high 
ratings on products which later default, the government might be sued by the investors 
who relied on the credit ratings.  
 A serious problem that could be encountered by a government-based system is 
that citizens might not be willing to have their tax dollars go towards an institution that 
does not directly benefit them. If taxpayers are not willing to fund a new government 
agency then this would not be a possibility. A second serious problem that could arise is 
moral hazard. The government-rating agency could potentially rate certain bell-weather 
institutions generously because of the ramifications they could have on the overall 
financial markets, which directly affects the U.S. economy.  
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 The government-based system could be an efficient way to produce accurate 
credit ratings with minimal conflicts of interest. This solution has its advantages and 
disadvantages but it’s a strong alternative to the current credit rating system.  
Each one of these systems is a plausible solution to the current imperfections in 
the credit rating industry (see the table below for the benefits and drawbacks for each). A 
single solution cannot address all the issues in the market, however it is essential to 
minimize the imperfections. It is evident that the credit rating industry needs to be 
reformed and each one of these solutions is a step in the right direction. 
Benefits and Drawbacks to Each Plausible Reform 
Policy 
Recommendation Advantages Disadvantages 
Market Based Model 
Minimizes conflicts of 
interest 
Some financial products 
will not be rated,  
omission of products 
Investment decisions no 
longer based on ratings Specific products might 
might lack liquidity, 
making it difficult to  
assess credit worthiness 
Removal of credit rating 
agencies from federal 
regulation 
Subscription Based Model 
Minimizes conflicts of 
interest 
Some financial products 
will not be rated,  
omission of products 
Promote accountability 
because of feedback  
mechanism 
Free-rider problem 
Not all information is  
accessible to public 
Potential conflicts of  
interests could arise 
Government Based Model 
Credit ratings are public 
information 
Potential conflicts of  
interests could arise 
All products could be  
rated, none are omitted 
Government could be  
held accountable for 
inaccurate ratings 
Central rating agency,  
set methodology for  
rating products 
Would need tax payers' 
approval 
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Chapter 4: Alternative Industry Solutions 
 The three policy changes mentioned above are strong options to reform the credit 
rating industry; however, there are a couple other alternatives that could have a 
significant impact as well. Two additional ways that the credit industry could be reform is 
through a two-tier system and a rating agency established to perform evaluations of the 
credit rating agencies.  
 
A. Two-Tier System 
 A two-tier system would have both subscription-based agencies and issuer-pay 
based agencies. Combining both systems would enable the consumers to reap the benefits 
of each system. A two-tier system would be established by having a select group of rating 
agencies operating on the issuer-pay model and another group operating on the 
subscription model. The main group would be the ratings agencies that were operating on 
the subscription model. This would be most effective because the issuers of debt are no 
longer influencing the ratings on the products being rated. All the major corporations and 
their financial products would be rated by the agencies under the subscription model. The 
second tier would be the issuer-pay agencies. This group would be paid by companies to 
rate their products but the products are the ones that were omitted from the first tier. This 
system would enable all products to be rated in a way that minimizes conflicts of interest. 
Both tiers of this system would have to collaborate with each other to ensure that the 
same products are not getting rated twice. Investors would benefit because they would 
still be able to get their ratings from the three main credit rating agencies with the best 
reputation, while still being able to find ratings on lesser know products through the 
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second tier. The two-tier system would incorporate the benefits of each system and 
would, most likely, lead to more accurate ratings.  
 
B. Rating Agency For Credit Rating Agencies 
 A new financial innovation that might develop as a result of the 2007 financial 
crisis would be a rating agency providing ratings on credit rating agencies. A rating 
agency of this sort is needed in the market because investors and institutions might find it 
difficult to determine which credit rating agency provides the highest quality ratings. This 
new rating company would operate under the subscription model so that there are no 
conflicts of interests. The company would gather information on the products each credit 
rating agency rates, the ratings they received, the performance of the products, and the 
conclusion if the products received the proper rating. The rating firm would then compile 
this information and provide a detailed analysis of which credit agencies were the most 
reliable and provided the best information. There is a significant benefit to this proposal; 
there would be a feedback mechanism for credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies 
have lacked a significant feedback mechanism and, thus, one of the reasons why they 
aren’t held accountable for their ratings. This new rating agency would be a feedback 
mechanism because if the credit rating agencies didn’t provide accurate or unbiased 
ratings, the rating company will determine that and investors will be made aware. 
Investors and Institutions would no longer rely on the credit rating agencies; hurting their 
reputational capital. As previously mentioned, reputational capital is essential for credit 
rating agencies and a way to hold them accountable would be to hurt their reputation in 
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the market. This new rating agency would provide a means to do that and fill the need for 
a feedback mechanism.  
 
C. New Regulation in the Credit Rating Industry 
 After the 2007 financial crisis, some steps have been taken to make the credit 
rating industry more reliable. The two main bills that were past that affected credit rating 
agencies were the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act, as previously mentioned, and the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Dodd-Frank 
legislation has attempted to protect against similar crises reoccurring in the future. Dodd-
Frank has also had an impact on the credit rating industry.   
The first provision from this piece of legislation was the removal of credit rating 
agencies references from all government regulation. This means that investors and issuers 
are no longer required to use any particular benchmarks of risk, such as credit ratings. 
This impacts the credit rating industry because credit ratings from these companies are no 
longer essential, making their ratings less significant in the market place. The credit 
rating industry strongly opposes this provision because their ratings are no longer 
mandatory. This rule change, once adopted, effectively frees banks from having to pay 
one of the designated agencies to rate their products. Credit rating agencies have done a 
significant amount of lobbying as a result of Dodd-Frank. The big three agencies have 
spent over $6 million in lobbying since this legislation was passed in 2009. This capital 
was to delay various provisions of the financial reform. However, credit ratings will 
continue to have a strong impact on the market and the credit rating industry will 
continue to be market makers.  
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Two other provisions from the Dodd-Frank legislation require the SEC to conduct 
a study to determine which ways the independence of NRSROs can be strengthened, as 
well as, a study of alternative business models for NRSROs compensation. These are 
steps to address conflicts of interest because their business models are the biggest 
concern. These three provisions are the most significant ones affecting credit rating 
agencies. The financial crisis of 2007 highlighted weaknesses in the credit rating industry 
and the government has taken steps to address these weaknesses. However, there are 
other policy changes that might make the industry more efficient and reliable.  
 
D. Alternative Perspectives to Increased Regulation 
 While many scholars and government officials believe more regulation will be 
better for the credit rating industry and the financial markets, White (2010) argues the 
contrary. White’s has a different perspective on what needs to be done in the credit rating 
industry. White believes that increased regulation will only raise the costs of providing 
ratings and, thus, would raise the barriers of entry into the market. This, White argues, 
will tend to discourage new ideas, new methodologies, new technology, new business 
models, and even discourage innovation. The increased regulation will only make the 
credit rating agencies more important in the financial markets, which is the opposite of 
what the regulation is focused on.  White suggests “ There is a better way.  That way 
involves less regulation of the credit rating agencies, as well as a reformulation of the 
prudential regulation of financial institutions’ bond portfolios.  The result would be more 
entry and more innovation in the provision of information for the bond markets and 
greater efficiency in those markets.” Less regulation is a strong alternative because it 
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would encourage competition. There are many other sources about the creditworthiness 
of bonds and its issuers, in addition to the major credit rating agencies. White also says 
that the reliance on credit rating agencies has been a function “of over seven decades of 
prudential regulation of institutional bond portfolios, which began with banks and then 
spread to insurance companies, pension funds, securities firms, and money market mutual 
funds, whereby these institutions were required to heed the ratings of a select handful of 
rating firms.” White makes a strong argument for deregulation because of the 
disadvantages that the new regulation could have.  
 Bonewitz (2010) also believes that there needs to be reform in the credit rating 
industry, but not in the form of increased regulation. Bonewitz argues that regulators 
need to remove the NRSRO distinction from the credit rating industry and establish a 
system based on market measures. Bonewitz says “NRSROs currently lack incentives to 
preserve their reputation for accuracy when it conflicts with selling regulatory licenses 
and garnering short-term profits. Replacing the NRSRO mechanism with a system that 
shifts ultimate responsibility from certified third parties to regulated investors, but allows 
such investors to largely rely on market measures of credit risk, will improve the 
performance of credit rating agencies, enhance the protection of investors, and encounter 
less credible resistance. Without further reform, inaccuracy will remain endemic to the 
NRSRO regime and another round of painful, dilatory downgrades should be expected 
with the next market downturn.” This is another alternative perspective on the reform that 
needs to occur in credit rating industry to address the existing imperfections.   
 A second paper that has similar views on reform in the credit rating industry is 
Utzig (2010). Utzig believes that placing the NRSRO label on an agency “places CRAs 
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in a position of unqualified authority as the central source of information about the 
creditworthiness of bonds and structured finance products.” Utzig also examines 
competition in the credit rating industry and appropriate reforms to address this 
imperfection. Utzig argues that “the current tight oligopoly is unlikely to be broken up 
under the existing “issuer pays” system because neither issuers nor CRAs have an interest 
in more ratings. Nevertheless, switching to an “investor pays” model should not in itself 
be expected to produce a quick fix. Whereas in the “issuer pays” model competition can 
lead to inflated ratings because the company chooses who should rate them, in the 
“investor pays” model there is a free rider problem, and it is not clear how the free market 
can resolve it. This dilemma could, however, be solved by decoupling the competition 
problem from the ratings market. The service required is an assessment of credit quality 
or the risk of default. A credit rating is only one of the instruments capable of performing 
this task. Credit default swaps, for example, fulfill a comparable function from an 
alternative starting point. If the relevant market is defined in this way, financial market 
regulation itself will automatically have a direct role to play in enhancing competition 
because by using ratings to regulate banks it contributes directly to the reduction in 
competition.” This excerpt provides a plausible alternative to the current issuer-pay and 
investor-pay models.  
 Stiglitz (2010) argues that increasing competition in the credit rating industry will 
not correct any existing imperfections. Stiglitz believes that increased competition would 
not correct the industry because conflicts of interest would still exist which is the most 
significant imperfection. Removing the barriers to entry is a very small reform, which 
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would not address the underlying problems. Stiglitz argues that much larger reforms need 
to take place in the credit rating industry. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The goal of this study was to determine what type of reform would best suit the 
credit rating industry. An analysis of the credit rating industry suggests that there are 
numerous imperfections, which need to be addressed. The main imperfections existing in 
the credit rating industry are a lack of accountability, lack of competition, conflicts of 
interest, and asymmetric information. Regulations, the SEC, and the financial 
markets/investors have not held credit rating agencies accountable for their ratings, which 
is evident by the lawsuit examples provided above. The lack of competition has resulted 
from barriers to entry established by the SEC and the conflicts of interest are a product of 
the issuer-pay model. Since the credit rating industry has such a large impact on the 
financial market, it is essential that these issues are addressed.  
These imperfections suggest that there must be a reform of the way credit rating 
agencies generate revenue and steps must be taken to hold them accountable for their 
ratings. The first major reform was moving towards a market-based system. This system 
would completely do away with credit rating agencies, eliminating many conflicts of 
interest and giving the market perceptions on the creditworthiness of financial products. 
Another suggested reform was moving from the issuer-pay model to a subscription-based 
model, similar to how Consumer Reports operates. This would eliminate some significant 
conflicts of interest and would be beneficial to the financial industry. The third plausible 
change would be to have a government-based system. This also has many advantages 
over the current issuer-pay model. Each one of these possible reforms has advantages and 
disadvantages, but the main objective is to produce unbiased and accurate ratings.  
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 The solutions that I believe would be the most effective would be the market-
based solution or the subscription-based model. Conflicts of interest, in my opinion, have 
hindered credit rating agencies’ ability to accurately rate financial products. Both the 
market-based and subscription-based solutions attempt to minimize conflicts of interest, 
which leads me to believe that they would have the best outcome. It is critical that proper 
actions are taken to address the many imperfections of the credit rating industry.  
Regulators have taken steps to address some of the issues in the credit rating 
industry, however much more needs to be done. This thesis highlights some shortcomings 
and provides possible solutions. There are some limitations of this paper however. Future 
research might want to examine which AAA rated products have defaulted since they 
were rated by the rating agencies and why those products received those ratings. The 
credit rating industry is essential to the financial markets, thus the reason why reform 
must correct the current market imperfections.  
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